Does Augustine's Theory Imply That the State is a Servant to the Church in City of God?

Saint Augustine of Hippo, hailing from what is now Tunisia, was one of the premier thinkers of the Christian Church, and was responsible for some of the first great advances of Christian theological thought since the New Testament. While he wrote an enormous amount of books and essays, the most extensive of his work would have to be his Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans. This work, comprised of twenty-two books and spanning over a thousand pages, discusses various areas of debate within the Christian world, including such things as the discrepancies between different editions of the Bible, why there must be evil in this world if we as a species are to have free will, the creation of our world and the Universe as a whole, and much more. Augustine also discusses the idea of the City of God, and the City of Men—which he also refers to as the Heavenly City and the Earthly City, respectively. The goal of this essay will be to explore the relationship that exists between these two cities, with the ultimate goal of determining whether or not the state should be a servant to the church based off of the theories presented by Augustine in City of God.

Augustine, in City of God, is writing a theological work—being that it assumes the existence of God, and views him as predicate for the existence of the Universe. He believes that we must all follow what the Scriptures tell us, for they tell the truth of the world, as they are the word of God, passed to us through his messengers—that is, the prophets. Now given this, Augustine defines the City of God as a city that is upheld by the Scriptures, with the guiding power of God's supreme providence. It is from this city that joy spreads to the whole of the Earth. To be a member of this city, one must subjugate themselves to the one true God, and not the false idols that those of the Earthly City have a tendency to worship. In many ways, this City of God is essentially the Heaven that we think of today, with it even being populated primarily by angels. Through worship of the one true God, that being the god of the Catholic Church, and subjugation to him while in the Earthly City, one makes themselves a pilgrim for the length of their stay in the Earthly City, with the ultimate reward for their devotion being ascension to the City of God after the death of the body in the Earthly City.

Going back to the time of Adam and his prodigy, we see two distinct lines. There is that of Cain, who created his line after fratricide, created the first physical Earthly City. They were not to ascend to the Heavenly City, due to their sins. This is in contrast with the sons of Seth, who were the devout, servants of God, and through the purity of their devotion, were to ascend to the City of God. The corruption of the Sons of Cain grew to such a great extent, however, that the line had to be removed by the biblical flood—though the Earthly City itself would remain, as all men are a part of it, and many of the children of Noah and his sons would be members of only the Earthly City, and not the City of God.

The Earthly City is that of which all men are a part of. The hope is that through worship, and service to God, one will have only to experience the death of the body, and that they will not have to experience the second death, which is the worst punishment of all—life without God.  The reason for the existence of the Earthly City is that we as a species corrupted ourselves through sin from the original perfection that God gave us. Thus, we live a life of perversion in the Earthly City, to be freed of the perverted form upon ascending to the City of God. God gave us a way to salvation though, and that is through worship and obedience to him, and his son, Jesus Christ. One form of obedience to Him and His laws is through humility—which Augustine says exalts the mind. In addition, one can better themselves and show their devotion to God by doing acts for their own sake, which betters oneself and society as a whole. In contrast, doing acts to better oneself, and for the purpose of being prideful is to ultimately hurt oneself, for being prideful is asserting one's own dominion as more important than that of God, thus breaking the fellowship that exists between God, oneself, and one's fellow man. However, it is important to note that while the Earthly City and Heavenly City are distinct, they are also intertwined, and they evolved together.

Augustine goes into a bit more detail as to how human society is formed, and how the Earthly City is organized. As men spread out after the Great Flood, they began to form different groups. These groups were built on the fellowship of those who shared common geography and culture, and these groups worked to benefit themselves primarily. Thus, human society, as it naturally formed, is divided against itself. In essence then, the common aim of human society, of Earthly City, is worldly advantage and satisfaction of desires. According to Augustine, this is not what the final aim of the Earthly City should be though. The final goal of all things should be peace, as peace is instinctively desired by both the irrational beast, and by the rational man. This, Augustine argues, is evident in how people conduct themselves. Even those who seek war, he says, are really only seeking to redefine the order of peace to better fit themselves and their position.

Augustine believes in a multitude of peaces, each satisfied by some ordering of relevant variables. Most important to the discussion of the role of the state and the church, however, is the peace between men, and thus, the peace of the Earthly City. This peace is established through an ordered agreement between two or more people. Peace with the Heavenly City is different, with it being achieved through “harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and a mutual fellowship in God.” Thus defined, the peace of the Earthly and Heavenly Cities are different, and require different conditions to be satisfied. This is the foundation of the argument that Augustine lays out for the separation of the state from the church.

He argues that the use of temporal things is related to the enjoyment of the earthly peace, which is different from the eternal peace of the Heavenly City, which comes from service and subjugation to God. This use of the temporal goods that God gave to the world, then, must be to satisfy the bodily pleasures enough to quench the thirsts of the irrational soul, so that one may exercise and satisfy the rational soul, which is satisfied through the acquisition of some sort of profitable knowledge that he will use to order his life and his moral standards. This requires the direction of the Divine, which can only be gotten by adhering the the guidelines given above to enter the Heavenly City. This process, then, is one that is for individuals. It in no way suggests or warrants the church having dominance over the state. This idea of individuals needed to work toward salvation, and the difference of the objectives of the Earthly City and the Heavenly City are continued throughout the rest of the nineteenth book of the City of God, which is where Augustine focuses on the role of the Earthly City in relation to the Heavenly one.

In addition to setting out how one is to interact and use the temporal objects of this world, the Scriptures also set out clear commandments on how one should live their life in relation to others. First, one should love God. Second, one should love their neighbor as they love themselves. The need to love God is fairly self-explanatory, though the reason to love your neighbor requires a bit more of an explanation. One should love their neighbor because they should want their neighbor to love them, so that if they are in need of assistance, their neighbor will help them. Therefore then, one should also help their neighbors, for this relationship of mutual love can only exist if both sides are satisfying their part of the arrangement. If this is had, then society will be organized in the righteous way of a peace among men based on a mutual love, with man doing harm upon no one, and coming to the aid of others. Again, this does not lend toward the state being a servant of the church, but toward men acting in the interest of the common good of the Earthly City. It just so happens to also be in-line with the Scriptures, and thus also satisfying part of the requirement to enter the City of God.

Important to the ideal ordering of society that is listed above is the domestic peace of individual households. Individual households are what society is based on, and so the peace of society is based on the peace of individual households. The heads of households should achieve this peace by giving commands based off of faith, and by treating all of people within the household as the same, with punishments being given to benefit the offender, being meant to deter them or others from re-offending. All of this then, should be based off of the laws of the city that one is a part of, to prepare those in the household to be obedient to the city they are also members of. Thus is how societal peace, and thus earthly peace, is in part achieved. Yet again, the church has no place in this.

So what else is involved in the earthly peace? For it is ordered agreement among men, based off of neighborly love and domestic peace, but there is more to it. In this, Augustine is heavily influenced by Cicero, taking from him the idea of needing justice and service toward the commonwealth being essential for society. Wrong institutions and states, then, would be interested only in the good of the strongest, or some other smaller part of the society, which would then be contrary to the commonwealth, justice, and therefore the early peace. This is then a reason for the Church not being the master of the state, as it would be interested in serving a particular group of people—that being Christians. This causes issues when one considers that society is not comprised of solely Christians, but of people of other faiths as well. Thus, the Church holding power over the state would create an injustice. Augustine acknowledges this, explaining that the Earthly City, being based not in faith, must aim for the earthly peace, as it is concerned with the interactions in the temporal existence between mortal men.   It is assumed that because of the impiety of the Earthly City—which is a result of the philosophical minds of men being able to be swayed from the truth—that it is lacking the justice, as without true religion, there is no true virtue. This then requires there to be laws concerning religion and tolerance in the Earthly City, those do not exist within the Heavenly City, as to exist within the Heavenly City, one must accept the one true God and be subservient to Him.  Due to the nature of the Earthly City, the temporal peace must be shared by both the good and the bad alike, as Earthly or temporal peace requires cooperation between the members of the society, while only through one's own actions can they achieve heavenly peace. Thus, the Heavenly City does not interfere with the laws of the Earthly City and that which is requited for mortal life, though it does require a level of devotion and loyalty to it while in the Earthly City (as stated previously).  Augustine concludes then that all seek to get to the City of God, but only those who pass personal judgment will one get there—those who are wretched will not enter the City.

Thus, it would seem, that Augustine is not in favor of a religious state. In fact, it appears that the contrary is true—that he is in favor of a secular state. For he explains that the Heavenly City does not care about the differences between cultures, laws, languages, and all of the other aspects of human existence that are used to divide us, as long as such states that have these qualities promote the earthly peace, and do not hinder the worship of the one true God. This can be combined with his aforementioned belief in the need for the Earthly City to be run as justly as possible, and to have not a group that would be favoring any particular group—as the Church would—and not the commonwealth as a whole and the fact that one can only ascend to the City of God through their personal efforts, it is clear that Augustine would not want the state to be subservient to the church.

What is the relationship between self-interest and the demands of society in Cicero's philosophy?

Of the utmost importance in government is the idea of public interest and the common good. This is especially true in the realm of republican and democratic forms of government, as opposed to aristocratic or monarchical forms. The fabled senator and consul of the late Roman Republic Cicero had much to say on this topic in particular, especially in regards to the relationship between self-interest of an individual and the demands that the society—in this case, the Roman Republic—places on the individual. This essay will examine this relationship in Cicero's political thought, looking at his On Duties and On the Republic.

It is the belief of Cicero that there is no part of life that is without duty. By duty, he means what we could call today responsibility. These duties are held to that which one is in fellowship with, with the different things in which a man can have fellowship being: those of race or tribe or tongue, those of city, and those of relations. The different fellowships of relations then are those stemming from the ties of marriage, of children, of the house, of brotherhood, of distant familial relations (in particular, cousinship), and then those between houses. Of these fellowships, the most important is of course to the Republic. So, duties are owed to those that one has a fellowship with. However, there is more to duties than to whom they are owed. In dealing with duties, one must do what is honourable. Honourable acts are described as actions being in line with the four parts or virtues, those being the perception of truth and integrity, the preservation of fellowship among men and to the agreements that one makes, the greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit, or the order and limit in everything that is said and done—which he notes includes modesty and restraint. These virtues are broad, and they are often intertwined with each other, though duties all come from at least one of these virtues.

Duty also deals with the concepts of justice and liberality. Justice, in the sense that Cicero discusses here, refers to not acting in an unprovoked manner. This means then that it is unjust to strike a man, however if he struck you first, then you are in your right to strike back. But, it is not just doing actions when unprovoked that is unjust. Failing to stop injustice from occurring when it is in ones power to stop it is also unjust. Justice also deals with respect for property, contributing to the common good, and keeping faith. So, it is up to a man who is just to uphold these ideals, and by doing so, uphold their duties. This is honourable. Cicero says that when men forget justice that they then strive for military command or honors or for glory. When they do this, they are acting dishonourably. Thus, justice is an integral part of honour and duties.

In regards to liberality, Cicero has a great deal to say. In his mind, liberality is one of the fundamental parts of being honourable, and of upholding one's duties. Liberality, or as he also liked to call it, kindness, could manifest itself principally in two ways: that being in granting of wealth to good causes, or the granting of kind services (and then also returning them).  To Cicero, being a liberal person with ones time and wealth was one of the most important things one could do, for several reasons. The first of these reasons is laid out in On the Republic, in which he points out that the state, in this case, the Roman Republic, did not raise and nurture its citizens without the expectation that they would not give back to it. This not only defends the idea of giving to the Republic so as to maintain it, but it also works as an argument for people to get involved in politics—which is in itself giving back the Republic, and thus fulfilling the fellowship that one has to it and one's fellow citizens. Though, as Cicero points out in On Duties, it is of the utmost importance that if one does get involved in public affairs that they remain as unbiased as possible, and that they work in the favor of the Republic as a whole, and no special interest group in particular. Corruption, according to him, is one of the gravest offenses. Though this is a bit off of the topic of liberality. The other reason that one should be liberal is because of the benefit that it provides for individuals that one's liberality is bestowed upon, and for the society as a whole. Being liberal promotes gratitude among those who receive the kindness that one bestows, and then further cultivates a culture of giving, one that cascades both temporally and spatially to create a better society in which citizens are conducting actions that provide benefits for others, and the society as a whole. Of course, this is assuming, as Cicero does, that the liberality that is being shown does not harm anyone in the giving, that it does not exceed the means of the one who is giving, and that the giving is in accordance with the standing of the person who is receiving the kindness. Thus, if one follows those simple rules, one is being both honourable and beneficial when they are being liberal.

It is here that the foundation of Cicero's argument lies, and how it relates to self-interest. For, it is the interest of everyone to be honourable, and Cicero argues that what is honourable is also beneficial. So, by fulfilling one's duties, one is being both honourable and beneficial. This therefore fulfills both the self-interest of individuals, and at the same time the demands of the society. While the end result of this logic does lead to that which is good a just—that being a society in which people care for each other and the Republic, participate actively in politics, and fulfill their various duties—it is based on fallacious logic, which causes a great deal of frustration for those with liberal inclination who agree with Cicero, and yet are unable to look past his illogical argument.

The argument that Cicero makes is thus. First, what is beneficial is just. Second, what is honourable is just. Ergo, what is honourable is beneficial. However, the conclusion that he reaches is false in nature. By his logic, the only guarantee is that what is just is either also beneficial or honourable. The correct way to link both the honourable and the beneficial would be as follows: what is just is beneficial, and what is just is honourable, ergo that which is just is both beneficial and honourable. A seemingly small distinction, but vital to the argument that he is trying to make. This is not saying that what is honourable is not also beneficial, but that by the argument that he makes, that one cannot assume that inherently what is honourable is also beneficial, and vice versa. This is of incredible import when one looks at the third book of On Duties, in which he devotes an incredible amount of his page to arguing against behaviors that he deems to be without benefit on the grounds that they are dishonourable. He argues this because he makes the inference that if an honourable action is beneficial, and any dishonourable action would be unbeneficial. This logic, does not hold though, as the basis of his initial argument also does not hold, as a beneficial thing does not have to be honourable—in fact, it can be dishonourable.

Take, for instance, the following scenario into consideration, which Cicero himself posed.  Say you have a merchant who is going to supply Rhodes with corn, as recent famine and blight has made the price of corn skyrocket. This merchant reaches the port, and is going to sell the corn to the people of Rhodes. However, he has information that would decrease the amount of money that he would make—that being that there is more ships with corn that will arrive in several days time. Is it beneficial for the merchant to not inform the people of Rhodes of this incoming shipment, thus lowering the price that he would be able to get for his corn? The answer, according to Cicero is no, as it would be dishonourable. However, that is untrue. The merchant would benefit, at least in the way of material wealth, even if he were to take a hit due to claims of dishonesty and/or dishonour resulting therein. That is, of course, assuming that the actions of the merchant are dishonourable at all. I would agree that it would be dishonourable to lie about the existence of the shipment of corn that was on its way to Rhodes, but if the people of Rhodes simply did not ask as to whether or not the merchant knew of any additional shipments that would be coming to the island, the merchant could simply remain silent. There is no action being taken here by the merchant, no deception being made on his part. Thus, there is no dishonour. The only real argument that Cicero makes in regards to dishonour being unbeneficial is that dishonourable actions are directly contrary to the law of nature, however, this too is bad logic. First, it assumes that natures is the source of laws, which it is not, as law comes from humanity and society. Second though, as he describes the law of nature, it simply says that nature desires that which is right, appropriate, and constant, and that it rejects the opposites of those. It says nothing about what is beneficial and what is not, and therefor, it cannot be used to justify that which is dishonourable being unbeneficial. The final issue with his logic is that he believes that all pleasures are dishonourable. This is perhaps one of the most wild of his claims. For, if this claim is true, then it is dishonourable to experience pleasure in partaking in, for instance, a glass of wine. This is a ridiculous notion, as is the idea that pleasure itself is a bad thing. Here Cicero joins in the delusion of the ascetic movements that have existed in our society for such a long time—or at least, it would seem he does.

Yet, despite all of this, Cicero's aims are good. He wants people to work for the benefit of the Republic as a whole, citing how it benefits them as well. And that logic is true, and Cicero should be applauded for such an excellent argument in favor of civic duty. However, his fallacious logic cannot be ignored, which is why it was discussed. So, through his linking of what is honourable and beneficial—which does often align, especially in regards to the duties in which he lists in On Duties—he links the interests of the individual with the demands that society as a whole has for the individual.

The Door

There is a door.
A door at the top of a stair.
A stair that is at the bottom of a tower.
A tower that is on top of a hill.
A hill that is on top of a plain.
A plain that is on top of a continent.
A continent that is on top of an ocean.
An ocean that is on a planet.
A planet that is in a solar system.
A solar system that is within a galaxy.
A galaxy that is within a galactic group.
A galactic group that is within a galactic mega-cluster.
A mega-cluster which is part of the fibres that together create the Observable Universe.

And behind that door,
Behind that door is you,
You with the ability to change everything with your actions,
If only you go out that door and try.

They Will

Look out there, upon the masses of people
Scurrying below.
They move with such purpose
And with urgency;
As if what they are doing matters
As if they as one of billions will make a difference
In the vast expanse that we call the Universe.
The funny thing is--
They will.

Does Jeremy Benthem's Utilitarianism Lead Logically Towards a Democracy or Towards a Benevolent Dictatorship?

Here is the first draft of my essay about Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. It is unlikely that I will post an updated draft, unless major chances are had. I expect there to be some small errors, and for that, I apologize now.

Man is by nature, a social animal. We organized ourselves into different social groupings based on geography, phenotypical features, beliefs, activities, and a seemingly uncountable amount of other differences and similarities that are held by the various members of our species. Within these social groups then, there is not a state of anarchy—but one of order. It is this order that is subject to the purview of politics. It is this order than is discussed and debated in philosophical political thought from the time of Aristotle thousands of years ago in Athens to the debates that are waged today, and everything in-between them. It is the subject of this essay to look at one political philosopher in particular—that being the British Jeremy Bentham. Bentham lived wrote his works during the later part of the Eighteenth Century, and spent much of his time discussing the idea of utility. The question to be examined in particular is whether or not his version of utilitarianism leads logically to a democracy, or whether it leads logically to a benevolent dictatorship—if such a form of government can indeed exist.

Before it can be determined as to which form of government Bentham's utilitarianism logically leads to, one must first understand how his utilitarianism functions. Fundamentally, he links everything that we as a species do to the two fundamental feelings of pain and pleasure. This includes all of the actions that we perform, as well as our sense of what is right, and what is wrong. The four sources of pain and pleasure then, according to Bentham, are physical, political, moral, and religious—termed as sanctions—with physical pain coming from a person or group of persons, political coming from the state, moral coming from “chance persons in the community, and not according to any rule” and religious being from a superior being. He sets out that his Principle of Utility recognizes that this slavery that mankind has to pain and pleasure is an underlying part of all systems. By utility, Bentham is referring to any act or object that produces a benefit, advantage, good, happiness, or pleasure—though if one thinks about it, benefits, advantages, goods, and happiness all produce pleasure in themselves—or that prevents mischief, evil, unhappiness, or pain to an individual or a community—though again, like those things synonymous with pleasure, mischief, evil, and unhappiness are also sources of pain. Thus, utility is essentially any act or object that brings about pleasure or that prevents the bringing about of pain. He believes that all people must and do act in accordance with this principle, even if it is done so unconsciously.

Bentham believes that the correct application of the Principle of Utility is to promote the interest of an individual or community. The interest of the community being the aggregate interest of the individuals that together make the community, and the interest of the individual being a simply arithmetic calculation of the sum of the pleasures minus the sum of the pains that are brought about by the execution of any particular action, where the difference between the pleasures and the pains is positive—that being, having more pleasure than pain. These pains and pleasures are valued, for an individual then, based off of their intensity, duration, certainty—and conversely, uncertainty—, and their propinquity—and conversely, their remoteness. When assessing the value of pain and pleasure for a group, one must also use the same criteria as for an individual, whilst also taking into account how likely it is that the event will occur again—which he calls its fecundity—, the chance that it will be followed by sensations of the opposite affects—which he calls its purity—, and finally how many people it affects—which he refers to as its extent. He argues then that it is the responsibility of government to adhere to the Principle of Utility in regards to the community in which it presides over in any actions that it carries out. Because it is the responsibility of the government to follow the Principle of Utility when legislating for its community, the causes of pain and pleasure are subject to the purview of legislation of the government. It is important to note, however, that all pleasures and pains have much to do with legislation, such as the pleasure that is derived from the strength an individual possesses.  With the question of how the government should act settled, the next logical question is how the government goes about doing this. The answer is quite simply, really. In order to follow the Principle of Utility, the government must reward—or rather, give pleasure—and punish—that being, inflicting pain—on individuals within the community to enforce or reinforce behavior that is in the interest of the community as a whole.

Positive reinforcement for actions that are in line with the Principle of Utility is fine and good, as it is bringing pleasure into the world, but what about the idea of punishment? Punishment is, after all, bringing pain into the world, which does, at its surface, appear to be in contradiction with the Principle of Utility. This is however, not the case—that is, if the punishment is given rightly. Punishment, according to Bentham, is an important part of maintaining order in society, and the formula for how punishments should be given is quite simple, really. First, in order for the state to punish, a law must first be broken. This can be a law such as theft, or it can be the breaking of a contract—or as he says, to be more general, compact—between multiple parties. Second, one must consider the intentionality of the act, the circumstances in which it occurred, and the consciousness of the conditions that accompanied it. All of these should be considered in what punishment should be given. This is because while punishment is evil, as it is bringing pain into the world, it is the lesser of the two evils that are present; that by punishing an individual, the government is providing enough pain that the calculus that the individual will make in the future regarding the same action they performed will lead them to the conclusion that it is not worth doing said act again; in regards to others, that the example made by punishing the individual who committed the crime will be enough to dissuade them from conducting the same or similar acts. However, the government should not hand-down punishments that are either too heavy nor too weak—the punishment should be just enough to change the calculus of the individual, and nothing more—for any more would be bringing unneeded pain into the world. By this same logic, there are times in which no punishment should be given, such as when an action bring no mischief, when the cost of the punishment is higher than the mischief that was brought about by the act, if the punishment would be ineffective—as is the case with ex post facto punishment, of ignorance of the law (but not ignorance through negligence, which is inexcusable), of infancy, of intoxication, of insanity, of actions of defense of self, of unintentional, unconscious, or involuntary acts—or if the mischief would cease without any punishment being given.

That covers how a government should go about adhering to the Principle of Utility. However, what a government is has not yet been defined. It is obviously associated with a group of people, but how is not revealed by Bentham in his discussion of the Principle of Utility. Instead, he discusses it in his A Fragment on Government. In this work, Bentham is responding to an author who is trying to lay out what governments are and how they function—among other things. The author says that society forms to protect the individuals within in—both in their persons, but also in their rights—and that governments exist as a way to organize societies. The original government then, is set up by the general consent of the people involved—that being the governors and the governed—and the government itself remaining as long as the two aforementioned groups fulfill their obligations in the compact that they have formed—namely that the governed will give obedience to the governors, and that the governors will act in the interests of the governed. Thus, according to Bentham, the proper amount of government is as much “as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order.” However, there are qualifications in being a governor, and for government itself.

First, in order to be a governor, one must posses certain endowments. The endowments that are believed important are wisdom, goodness, and the ability to have and effectively use political power. He then asserts that there are three types, or as he calls them, species, of government—being monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Monarchy is defined as rule by one, democracy rule by “all,” and aristocracy rule by a number between one and all. These three types of government, it is argued, have their advantages and disadvantages. Monarchy is said to be the best at the execution of law, as the efficacy of the execution of law is based on the will of that which is executing it—as will that is both swift and true with a single person. However, a monarch lacks in wisdom and goodness as compared to an aristocracy or a democracy. Aristocracies excel in wisdom, but are poor in execution and in goodness when compared to the other forms of government, while democracies excel in the goodness at the ends of their laws, while their efficacy and the execution is lacking comparatively. So are the three forms of government as laid out in A Fragment on Government. While Bentham makes no direct assertions as to which is the most desired of these three forms of government, he does leave clues as to what he believes is the correct form of organizing society, which lead into the logical form of government that results from his utilitarianism—that being either a benevolent dictatorship or a democracy.

First, let us look to back to Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this work, Benthem lays out his Principle of Utility, and otherwise talks about how it is applied to legislation, taking no particular stand as to any particular form of government being better than another. However, toward the end of this work, he does talk about the motives of individuals, which is important when trying to determine if a single individual should be running a government, or if many should. In the last part of the work, in the section on the penal branch of jurisprudence, he raises the question as to whether or not a man can be brought to care for the well-being and happiness of others, concluding that while the only certain happiness he will attempt to satisfy is his own, that man does have some intrinsic motive, if only at a level of his own social status, to care for other members of the community. Sympathy would also be important in this regard. Therefore, if one is to rule, they must have a bias towards sensibility and sympathy, and they must possess a great enough intellect to understand that by helping others that they are doing good—in short, good private ethics.23. While this does not point directly towards a benevolent dictatorship, where the dictator would be the person who is most disposed towards the aforementioned traits, it does rule out the idea of a direct democracy, in favor of more elite democratic republican models of government. All that Bentham shows here is that whomever would legislate would simply need to have good private ethics.

Now, we must turn again back to A Fragment on Government. If we look to the segment on the differences between a natural and a political society, Bentham states that a political society is a positive one, while a natural society is a negative one, with a political society being one in which people have a habit obedience to a person or a group of persons, while a natural society is one in which people have a habit of conversing with each other while not having a habit of obedience to a person or group of persons. Again, like the previous example of Bentham's biases towards one form of government or the other, this example does not help the cause of a democracy. It is natural for people to converse with each other, as was the ways of bands of humans back in time immemorial. While this is referred to as tribalistic government today, it is democratic in nature. Now, this does not rule out the idea of an democratic republic, but it does most certainly hurt its prospects, pointing more toward an aristocratic or monarchical form of government. At the same time, Bentham also uses an example that favors democracy more than it favors a benevolent dictatorship. In describing how people can interact with one another, he describes the idea that a person may both give and receive orders at the same time—even governors. Because a benevolent dictatorship would be a monarchical form of government, in that there is only one ruler, the benevolent dictator, this logic would not apply to it, but rather to an democracy or some other non-monarchical mixed form of government.

Of particular relevance to the question at-hand is Bentham's discussion of the British House of Commons—which is a democratic institution. When discussing it, there is brought up the issue of poverty among the members. It is argued that if they are poor, then they cannot be educated, and if they are not educated, then would be illiterate, and therefore ignorant, and altogether unfit for the job they have. While he eventually counters this by countering the assumption that the members elected would be poor, there is still the issue as to the status of the electorate. In the Britain of the day, and in the current Capitalistic world that we live in today, the majority of people live in poverty. The majority of the people are un—or at the very least, under—educated. While illiteracy is not nearly as large of an issue as it would have been at the time of Bentham, it does still exist—but more so, ignorance exists. Without a proper education, people are able to read, but not able to properly sift through the massive amounts of information that is available to them—leading to beliefs in such ludicrous things as vaccinations causing autism and global climate change not existing, or not being caused by mankind. Given this, it would seem that the majority of people, when poor, un and/or under-educated, and ignorant, they are ripe for manipulation and mistakes—mistakes that an educated elite, or a single benevolent dictator, chosen from the ranks of those predisposed to good private ethics as Bentham laid out in his An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation, would not make. This is compounded with the fact that the poor work hard and long, and with little time for leisure, they are unable to contemplate and reflect on legislation, and thus are prone to act rashly. It was true at the time of Bentham, and it is true today, with people having to work multiple jobs just to get by.

Looking at all of this combined, it would seem that the most effective, and thus the most logical form of government that comes from the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham would that of a benevolent dictatorship. While Bentham does believe that people can both give an receive orders, and does have faith in legislators picking the path of legislation that produces the least mischief—there does not appear to be much else that he says in favor of democracy. Most of the utilitarianism that Bentham lays out applies to all forms of government—especially in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, which only really lends itself towards either a benevolent dictatorship or a republic of some sort. In A Fragment on Government though, Bentham leans heavily in favor of dictatorial or aristocratic—used here to mean oligarchical—forms of government, with the idea of a negative natural society and positive political society to all-together justified fear of ignorance and the uneducated making decisions in government. If we look at Bentham's utilitarianism, it would seem to lead logically toward a benevolent dictatorship.

Aristotle--a Good Man vs. a Good Citizen

Here is an essay that I wrote on the differences between a good man and a good citizen, as seen by Aristotle. This essay was written under duress, with the reading of Ethics and Politics occurring within a 72 hour window (along with the writing of this essay). I don't know how many of you will enjoy it, but here you go.

Humanity has walked the surface of the Earth for thousands of years. Up until quite recently, this has been in the form of small tribes and bands of hunter-gathers. Approximately four thousand years ago, that changed, with the advent of agriculture and subsequently the creation of civilization. While this first occurred in the Fertile Crescent and along both the Nile and Indus rivers, the first of what we would call “Western Civilization” began in a region of the Balkans called Greece. The Greek polis or city-state was the hallmark of the era, and several strong states, such as Sparta, Corinth, and Athens, dominated the region. It is also to the Greeks that we—that being “Western Civilization”—looks back to for the fundamental foundations of our philosophical thought. We look to Socrates and his methodology. We look to Plato, and his Republic. And we look at Aristotle, the who was the student of Plato, and whose work much of “Western” thought is still based off of today. While Aristotle tackled many important and difficult issues during his time, one of the most important questions he attempted to answer was what makes a good man, and what makes a good citizen, and how they are not entirely the same.

In order to understand what makes a good citizen, one must first understand what a citizen is—for Aristotle had a quite specific definition, which he laid out in full in his Politics,  one that is not the same as is used today. Today, we view all people over the age of eighteen as citizens (eighteen being the age at which people can vote). We do not put any restrictions on who can become citizens, so long as they were born in the State in which they wish to be citizens, or they have at least one parent who is a citizen. For Aristotle though, it took much more to be a citizen. Firstly, in order to be a citizen, one must first be a man—for women had no real place in public life, as their place was the household. Secondly, one must not be a slave, but a free man. In addition to not being a slave, one must not have a career in fields of manual labour. Aristotle adds this specification because he believed that if one worked in manual labour, then instead of being ruled via statesmanship—also referred to as citizen rule over fellow citizens and rule by turns—they were being ruled by someone who ruled them like a master and his slaves. So being a manual worker meant you too were not a citizen. Another requirement that Aristotle had was that both of the parents of an individual must be from the place that they are wanting to be a citizen of (I say from the place in which they want to be a citizen of, for women could not be citizens. Though in order to be an Athenian, one must have an Athenian father and mother)4. The last major requirement regarding the nature of the individual citizen is that they must be of the proper age to serve in either judicial or legislative office. Aristotle also had requirements in the actions of the people who were eligible to be citizens. He believed that in order to be a citizen, one must meet certain obligations—chief among which was holding an official position in the State. This, he said, was vital in ensuring the constitution of the State—constitution here meaning the underlying conditions/states that exist within—which is essential for the survival of the State.

Such is how Aristotle defines what it means to be a citizen of a city-state with a democratic constitution. The question still remains however as to what makes a citizen good. For  this, Aristotle looks to the idea of virtues, which he explains in much more detail in his work Nicomachean Ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tries to decipher happiness and virtues, and ultimately what is good. To simplify, he viewed good as the end of goals. He then also viewed happiness as complete, without qualification—meaning that it is a good. Virtues, he said, are chosen by people for their own right, but also in an attempt to achieve happiness, and ultimately contribute towards one being good. He believed that there were two types of virtues—those of the soul and those of the body. Virtues were in his mind the middle ground—which he calls the mean—between excess and deficiency in the aspect of life they are related to.10 Essentially, virtues are experiencing pleasure and pain at the right times, and in the right amounts. One example Aristotle gives us is the that of giving and taking money. In this example, the virtue is generosity, the excess is wastefulness, and he deficiency is stinginess. In this example, a wasteful person would give too much money away, and take too little, whilst a stingy person would take in too much money, and give to little away. It is also important to note that Aristotle believed that it was only actions that involved rational choice that were subject to the purview of virtue. He also believed that actions were crucial in being good, saying that, “in life, it is those who act rightly who will attain what is noble and good,” and that, “actions in accordance with virtue are pleasant in themselves...[as well as being] good and noble.”

It would seem, then, simple enough to be considered good be Aristotle. A good person would need to simply do virtuous actions. These virtuous actions would be good, as virtue is good, and therefor, they will make the person who carries them out good as well. While this is the essence of what Aristotle says, there is more to it. Firstly, the actions that the person takes must be voluntary in nature, for there is nothing virtuous in involuntary actions. Conversely, however, an individual is not responsible for involuntary actions—at least in how it affects one being virtuous or not. Cohesion and ignorance both constitute an action being involuntary—or the choosing of the lesser of two evils, though that is subject to the judgment of a State official—though ignorance through negligence does not make the actions of an individual involuntary. While most involuntary actions are pardonable, it is important to note that some are not—though Aristotle does not go into more specific detail on this particular matter. He also believed that actions were influenced by perception, desire, and intellect—with desires shaping rational decision making. One might believe that, based off of what has already been said that man and woman and child and beast could all satisfy the criteria that Aristotle has given. This is however, not the case. Aristotle dealt very little with the subject of women, however in regards to children and animals, he believed that they cannot make rational decisions.

Such is how Aristotle described the nature of virtues, and how they are used and applied, in Nicomachean Ethics. Taking this, we can then apply it to how he discusses the makings of a good citizen and a good person in Politics. He points out that all citizens have a role that they play in society—whether it be a legislator or member of the judiciary, or some other role entirely—and that there is virtue in these roles, but that they also share the common role of maintaining stability of the constitution of the State. However, due to the vast amount of constitutions that exist within the state of individuals, there cannot be one perfect virtue of a good citizen. While there is no single perfect virtue of a good citizen, that is not the case for a good person, as Aristotle said, “a man is good because of one single virtue which is perfect virtue.” This then means, according to Aristotle, that one can have a good citizen while not being a good person. However, that does not exclude the possibility that a particular person cannot share the same virtue that makes them a good citizen and a man—such as a good ruler, who is both good and wise (having the practical wisdom that is not shared by other citizens)23. However, if the common citizen has not practical wisdom, then there must be some commonality that makes them akin to their ruler, for the ruler is both a ruler and a citizen. Aristotle's answer to this is that the virtue of a citizen is to understand the governing of free men from both points of view (that of the governed and the governor), and that the virtue of practical wisdom belongs to rulers whilst the virtue of correct opinion belongs to those being ruled. It is with that that Aristotle concludes his discussion of what makes a good citizen and a good person in politics, shifting to a discussion of the different forms of government.

In the discussion of what makes a citizen and what makes one good, and how that then relates to what makes a good person, Aristotle had a cohesive—though long-winded answer. He believed that a citizen was a free man who was born to two inhabitants of the State in which he belonged to, who worked in fields in which they were ruled over by statesmanship, and not a master, such as a manual laborer would, who is of a certain age, and who holds either legislative or judicial office. He believed that what makes a citizen good is the virtue of understanding the governing of free men from both points of view, the virtue of practical wisdom (for leaders), the virtue within fulfilling the role that one has, and the upholding of the stability of the constitution of the State. In his detailing of what makes a person good, Aristotle looked at virtues, actions, and rational decisions—with those who were good being those who acted rationally with virtue. Due to the nature of what makes a good person, and what makes a good citizen then, it is possible for one to be a good citizen without being a good person, and for one to be a good person without being a good citizen.

These are the views of Aristotle. While he may—and indeed was—a brilliant thinker, and quintessential in the development of philosophical thought in both the “Western” world and the Islamic world, he was, in my opinion, mistaken in many aspects. First, there is the issue of sexism, which I hope is self-explanatory, and requires nothing further. There is also the issue of his belief that animals and children cannot make rational decisions. I believe that this train of thought is misguided, for is it not true that all life acts under the rationals that it has gained through both experience and instinct? If one were to punish a child every time they exhibited unwarranted wroth, then said child would rationally choose to stop exhibiting said wroth. The same can be said with a horse, which if fed when complying with its trainer and punished when not, the horse will rationally choose to comply with the trainer. I also find fault in the idea that a manual worker cannot be a citizen. What makes one who takes more direct orders (such as a slave) any less a person that someone who does not? For manual workers are not slaves, as they have the choice in what they do (to the extent that people have choices given the metaphorical hand of cards that is dealt to them). Those are but a few of the problems that I have with Aristotle, though in a whole, he train of thought does make a good deal of sense.

Is all violence secular violence?

Cananaugh’s writing in The Anatomy of Myth focuses on debunking—or rather countering—the three main arguments as to why religion causes violence4 (those being that it is absolutist, divisive, and it is insufficiently rational). One of the main arguments that he raises against the different theories of religion causing violence is that the distinction is not clear enough between religious violence and secular violence. This is a valid criticism, assuming that there is a difference. I contend that there is no difference between religious and secular violence. I argue that there is only secular violence, and it is all rooted in power and security.

We must first look at why violence occurs. I will start with the international level, and the largest form of violence—war. According to offensive realism, war occurs because states are always trying to increase their security. However, because international affairs is a zero-sum game, they can only achieve security by taking it from others. This is why war occurs over territory. Territory acquisition increases the power of a state, and therefore, its security. This logic also applies to war over resources—especially important resources such as Rare Earth Elements, which are used in the manufacturing of advanced weaponry. Now, I believe that these would be considered acts of secular violence, but what about holy war? Well, if you apply the same logic of the acquisition of land, it would seem that they are about power. It could also be that holy wars are about the power of the religion as a whole. By waging a holy war, by winning one, the religion is asserting its religious authority over others, and over the people it already has under its control. So, while there is a religious justification, holy wars (such as Crusades or Jihad) are actually secular wars for power.

Take, for example, the Inquisition. Some might say that the violence conducted by the Inquisition was without a secular cause—that it was a case of pure, unadulterated religious violence. I am not one of those people. Put yourself in the shoes of the Catholic Church, for a moment. Right now, you have dominion over all of Christendom (to some extent). Reading is not widespread and religious diversity is low. The best way to maintain power is to minimize free thought. If people think freely, then they can rebel against you. People who held heretical beliefs, therefore, must be removed so that your power will remain. So in that sense, the Inquisition (and all religious discrimination by a majority group against minority groups) are done for the sake of power.

Let us now turn our attention to religious terrorism—specifically that of radical Islamism. Now, one could say that they are fighting a war against “the infidel.” One could argue that terrorism by groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas is religious in nature—but I do not. If you look at the places where these terrorist groups originated—Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan—they are all places that are still going through the process of colonialization. This is in itself a time marked by instability—without the added support of authoritarian regimes by Western powers—namely the United States. So while they may use religion as a justification, as a rationalization for their acts of violence, these terrorist groups are really acting as guerillas. They are fighting against oppression for the power of self-determination that has been denied to them by the West.